Employment protection legislation and job stability: a European cross-country analysis by Cazes, Sandrine & Tonin, Mirco
  
 
 
School of Social Sciences 
Economics Division 
University of Southampton 
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK 
 
 
Discussion Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics 
 
Employment Protection Legislation       
and Job Stability:  An European Cross 
Country Analysis 
    
Sandrine Cazes & Mirco Tonin  
 
No. 0902 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available on our website 
http://www.socsci.soton.ac.uk/economics/Research/Discussion_Papers
 
 
ISSN 0966-4246 
 1
Employment Protection Legislation and job stability: 
An European cross country analysis 
 
Sandrine Cazes1 & Mirco Tonin2, February 2009 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Globalization, information and communication technologies changes are increasingly 
intensifying competitive pressures and call for more responsive labour markets all over the 
world. Firms have to adjust frequently their operations and their labour force to meet 
fluctuations in demand and progress in economy. The need for more flexible labour markets 
has led to significant labour market reforms, which in Europe focused very much on 
employment laws and in particular those governing the “atypical” forms of employment (e.g. 
fixed-term, part-time, temporary work). Actually several reforms were introduced in Europe 
at the end of the1980s and during the nineties to ease off rules for temporary contracts. While 
this could have contributed to increase labour market segmentation in some European 
countries, it certainly fed a general feeling of insecurity: labour markets are perceived as 
changing dramatically and said to face a secular change towards more and more short-term 
and flexible jobs. Since these jobs would not allow workers and employers to invest and 
benefit from the long-lasting employment relationships (training, trust, access to social 
benefits, etc.), a shift towards “end of work” would require a serious rethinking of social 
protection and labour market institutions and policies. It is thus important to objectively 
assess to which extent job stability has gone or is going to fade away; and to which extent 
labour markets of economically advanced countries have changed dramatically as it is often 
echoed by media. There have been numerous studies on job stability, most of them focusing 
on the United States and the United Kingdom where the issue has retained most attention. 
While a number of analysis have tried to compare job stability over time in one specific 
country, few have examined changes over time and across countries (except OECD, 1993 and 
1997; ILO, 1996, 2003 and 2005).  
 
This paper tries to shed some light on the actual changes that occurred in the labour markets 
dynamics of the European Union 253 (EU-25) over the last decade using job tenure4 data. It 
then investigates the potential role of employment protection legislation (EPL)5  changes in 
 
1 Economic and Labour Market Analysis, ILO.  
2 Economics Division, University of Southampton. 
3  Bulgaria and Romania could not be included due to data availability. Data for Austria were excluded because 
they were not always reliable nor fully comparable. 
4 Defined as the length of time a worker has been continuously employed by the same employer.  
5 EPL refers to regulatory provisions that relate to hiring and firing practice, particularly those governing unfair 
dismissals, termination of employment for economic reasons, severance payments, minimum periods, 
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explaining differences in the dynamics of job stability across countries but also across age 
groups in light of the dual-track reform strategy introduced in Europe during the same period: 
in most European countries, reforms were made typically at the margin (for new hires), while 
EPL for the incumbent workers remained unchanged. Thus, if the legislation does not apply 
uniformly to all workers, the effects of EPL reforms are expected to be disproportionately felt 
by new entrants, such as the young, women, and possibly immigrants.  
 
The paper opens with a descriptive analysis of job stability measured through job tenure in the 
EU-25, and its evolution over the last years. The level and structure by age of this indicator is 
our main empirical material. Data used comes from Labour Force Surveys (EUROSTAT) up 
to 2006.  The analysis shows no generalized decrease in job tenure but a trend towards shorter 
tenure of young workers (15-24) in most European countries. In a second step, the paper 
examines the possible explanations behind this trend, focusing on employment protection 
legislation. An econometric analysis is conducted to test the existence of a link between 
employment protection and job stability. In particular, we look at the impact of employment 
protection on average tenure and on the incidence of temporary employment. Finally, some 
policy recommendations are provided. 
2. Assessing job stability: what do tenure data tell? 
 
The length of time employed individuals have spent with their current employer, job tenure6, 
is a commonly used variable in studies of the labour market that examine labour market 
stability at the macro level. Indeed, another way of evaluating stability would consist in 
studying workers’ individual transitions on the labour market, but this would be quite difficult 
and complex to get an overall and comparative analysis. In the following we are mainly 
interested in the question whether or not there has been a marked change in average tenure 
over time and across countries of the EU-257, which would indicate more unstable positions.  
2.1. Preliminary evidence for Europe  
The high incidence of long-lasting employment relationships is one of the most remarkable 
features of labour markets in European countries. Recent studies have shown a clear 
preference for stability: 68 % of working Europeans still have the same employer as they had 
five years ago, while 57 % see themselves being with the same employer in five years’ time 
(Dublin Foundation, 2007). Another remarkable feature is that firms tend to hoard labour 
during recessions, even if this behaviour involves the cost of paying a wage rate higher than 
labour productivity (Hamermesh, 1989). These two pieces of evidence suggest that both 
workers and firms attach a positive value to long-term employment relationships. Economic 
theory provides three main explanations for this observed pattern. The first refers to the 
existence of firm-specific human-capital, which creates an obvious incentive for both workers 
and firms to establish long run relationships. The value of a long-term relationship stems from 
 
administrative authorization for dismissals, and prior consultations with trade union and/or labour administration 
representatives.   
6 Actually the proper terminology should be “employment tenure” to capture the idea that continuity of tenure is 
not broken by job changes within the same enterprise (internal flexibility). But as “job tenure” is the most 
commonly used for this concept, this paper will refer to it. 
7 See footnote 3 
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the fact that the quality of the match between the worker and the firm is revealed over time as 
tenure accumulates (Jovanovic, 1979)8. Another explanation ─ possibly complementary ─ 
refers to the institutional settings, and in particular employment protection legislation: 
economic models indicate that employment should be more stable and individual employment 
relationship more durable when legislation is more protective. We develop and explore below 
this argument. Looking at simple cross-countries evidence, we find indeed that tenure 
correlates with the degree of EPL (chart 1). 
 
Chart 1 Average long-term tenure versus EPL(1) 
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(1) EPL indicator as measured by the OECD;   
Source: OECD; EUROSTAT and own calculations  
 
A third explanation for job tenure relates to workers’ heterogeneity (Blumen et al., 1995). 
According to this theory, a change in job tenure would reflect a change in workers’ preference 
for mobility (in which case, mobility would be voluntary). Although workers differ in their 
attitude towards mobility, one may expect age to be a critical variable, since long-term 
relationships provide workers with an insurance against income fluctuations and enable them 
to build family and social relations through stable arrangements (dwelling, school attendance, 
etc.).  
 
Table 1 presents the average tenure of the main EU countries based on EUROSTAT data. In 
2006, EU (unweighted) average tenure for the 27 countries was 10.8 years, at the same level 
than 1999 (weighting countries by employment we also get the same average for 1999 and 
2006 at 10.6 years). While cross-country differences are quite pronounced, the data indicate 
that the shortest tenure are to be found in the new EU members: the Baltic States stand out as 
countries with the lowest tenure (less than 8 years on average), below countries with very 
flexible labour markets such as Denmark, Ireland or the Netherlands (tenure below 10 years). 
The longest average tenures are found in Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Italy and Belgium, 
closely followed by Luxembourg, France, Poland and Malta. While cross-country differences 
 
8 For a detailed presentation see Auer, Cazes and Spiezia, 2001. 
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seem to be consistent over time, no general increase in instability seems to have taken place 
over the last years in Europe. Thus, figures for the most recent period (1999-2006) seem to 
confirm previous findings for the 1992-1999 period (Auer, Cazes, 2000; Auer, Cazes & 
Spiezia, 2001).  
 
Table 1. Average job tenure (years)  
 
Country   1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium  12.1 11.8 12.3 12.4 12.2 
Denmark  8.8 8.5 9 9 8.6 
Finland  10.4 10.4 10.8 10.8 10.6 
France  11.6 11.4 12.1 12.1 11.8 
Germany  10.7 10.7 11.3 11 11.1 
Greece  13.4 13.5 13 13.2 13.1 
Ireland 9.6 9.8 9.3 9 9.6 
Italy 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.1 12.3 
Luxembourg 11.3 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.7 
Netherlands  9.9 9.5 11 11.4 10.7 
Portugal 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.9 12.9 
Spain  10.1 10.1 9.8 9.7 9.6 
Sweden 12.1 11.8 11.6 11.1 10.9 
United Kingdom  8.7 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.9 
Cyprus 10.4 10.5 10.1 10.3 10.5 
Malta  na      11 11.3 11 11.5 
Czech Republic  9.4 9.7 9.7 9.9 10 
Estonia  7.3 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.8 
Hungary  9.2 9.5 9.7 9.7 9.8 
Latvia na na   7.9 8 7.8 
Lithuania 7.9 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.5 
Poland 12.2 11.7 11.6 11.6 11.3 
Slovakia na   na   9.7 9.8 9.8 
Slovenia 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.7 13.1 
Average (weighted) 10.8 10.7 10.9 10.9 10.8 
Average 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Sources: Eurostat, LFS 
 
 
However, this direct assessment of job stability has to be interpreted with great caution, 
because of two effects: composition and economic cycle. The composition effect stems from 
the fact that, as the average tenure is a weighted sum with respects to group of workers with 
different characteristics, changes in the weights can mask the actual variation in tenure within 
each group. Thus aggregate trends in job tenure may also reflect changes in the demographic 
composition of the labour force and in the economic cycle. Average tenure is indeed highly 
dependant on the age structure of the working population: workers are likely to be more 
mobile when they are young – either voluntary to accumulate different experiences and get 
promotions by changing jobs or involuntary because they may be the first group targeted for 
dismissals. As a result, a country with a relatively young population will display shorter 
average tenure than one with an ageing population. The same demographic phenomenon 
occurs over time: given that older workers have longer tenure on average, an ageing 
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population could be masking a shift towards less secure jobs. In order to take into account this 
potential bias, the variation in the average tenure was decomposed in two components for the 
most recent period (1999-2006)9. The first component reflects the variation in the average 
tenure due to change in the age distribution; the second component measures the variation in 
the non weighted average tenure, i.e. the variation in the average tenure that would have 
occurred if the age distribution had remained unchanged as in the starting date (here 1999, see 
box 1 below). 
 
Box 1 
 
 
As shown in table 2, in the large majority of the countries considered10, the shift in the age 
distribution towards elderly workers has “mechanically” contributed to an increase in average 
tenure. Once the effect of age is taken away, it becomes apparent that eighteen over twenty 
two European countries in the sample show some reduction in average tenure. Only in 
Finland, Sweden and Poland the age distribution has changed as to reduce it. In the 
Netherlands for example, the increase in average tenure seems to a large extent due to 
population ageing. So, this decomposition exercise shows that in some countries, the apparent 
stability in tenure was the result of the counteracting process of ageing workforce. This 
suggests that it is very important to analyze average tenure by age group; while we focus on 
tenure profiles by age group, other characteristics such as industry or educational attainment 
 
9 This is to follow-up and update previous research conducted along these lines for the (1992-1999) period (see 
Auer, Cazes and Spiezia, 2001). 
10 This decomposition could be made only for 21 countries of the EU since data for Malta were only available 
from 2000, while those for Latvia and Slovakia from 2001 only. As getting the proper starting data is crucial in 
this type of analysis, we thus excluded these three countries. Data for Austria were excluded as in previous 
sections. 
Decomposition of average tenure 
 
Average tenure for year x is given by: ATx = ∑j sj,x ATj,x,, where: j is an index for age group (in our 
case 3 groups: 15-24, 25-44, 45+) and ATj,x is average tenure for age group j in year x, sj,x is the 
share of the population belonging to age group j in year x. The change in Average Tenure between 
year y and x can be written as:   
 
ΔAT = ∑j sj,x ATj,x - ∑j sj,y ATj,y = ∑j (sj,x ATj,x - sj,y ATj,y) 
 
We can write the change in average tenure due to age group j as:  
 
sj,x ATj,x - sj,y ATj,y = (sj,x - sj,y) ATj,y + (ATj,x - ATj,y) sj,x = Δsj ATj,y + ΔATj sj,x 
 
Aggregating across j, we can decompose the change in Average Tenure as: 
 
ΔAT = ∑j (Δsj ATj,y + ΔATj sj,x) = ∑j Δsj ATj,y + ∑j ΔATj sj,x 
 
where:  
 
• ∑j Δsj ATj,y represents the change in AT due to changes in the age distribution  
• ∑j ΔATj sj,x represents the change in AT due to changes in average tenure within each age 
group 
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are  likely to matter for tenure (see for example, Auer, Cazes, 2002 for disaggregation by sex, 
age, sector and education).   
 
Table 2. Decomposition of the changes in average tenure (1999-2006) 
Country dAge dAverageTenure Total 
Belgium 0.65 -0.58 0.06 
Denmark 0.37 -0.57 -0.19 
Finland -0.21 -0.44 -0.65 
France 0.43 -0.28 0.15 
Germany 0.34 0.10 0.44 
Greece 0.48 -0.75 -0.27 
Ireland 0.64 -0.64 0.01 
Italy 0.38 -0.73 -0.35 
Luxembourg 0.84 -0.41 0.43 
Netherlands 0.96 -0.15 0.81 
Portugal 0.56 -0.07 0.49 
Spain 0.28 -0.71 -0.43 
Sweden -0.01 -1.12 -1.13 
United Kingdom  0.26 -0.11 0.15 
Czech Republic  0.47 0.05 0.52 
Estonia 0.07 0.39 0.47 
Cyprus  0.36 -0.29 0.06 
Lithuania 0.31 0.28 0.60 
Hungary 0.80 -0.21 0.59 
Poland -0.09 -0.79 -0.88 
Slovenia 0.74 -0.26 0.48 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
2.2. Decomposition by age group 
Table 3 reports the average tenure by age group in 1999 and 2006. In a majority of countries 
of the EU-25, tenure decreased for the age group 15-24, suggesting that job instability has 
increased for the new cohorts of entrants into the labour market, while it did not change in 
Finland, Luxembourg and Cyprus. However, it increased in Belgium, Ireland, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Slovenia and the United Kingdom11.  In some countries, ─ Denmark, 
Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden and Slovakia─ the reduction in tenure seems generalised to all 
age groups; in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Hungary, job tenure of mature (25-44) and elderly workers (45+) remained constant or even 
increased. These first findings suggest that in some countries and for some age groups there 
has been a decrease in tenure and that this decrease has been more pronounced for young 
workers (15-24). This evidence is however not sufficient to establish the existence of a trend 
towards shorter tenure because of the economic cycle effect: average tenure could be assumed 
 
11 Interestingly, the same pattern for the same countries was already detected in our previous research – with the 
exception of Portugal (see Auer, Cazes & Spiezia, 2001).  
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to decrease in recession periods, as more workers are laid off and general economic 
uncertainty induces firms to look for more flexibility of their labour force; conversely, one 
may expect average tenure to increase in upswings, when firms are more inclined to offer 
stable jobs.  
 
However, the sign of the impact of the economic cycle on average tenure is more complex to 
capture: during the upward phase of the cycle, job tenure may actually either decrease ─ 
because of more voluntary mobility due to more professional opportunities; and because of 
the shorter duration of newly created jobs (comes with zero tenure)─ or increase, because of 
the reduction of lay-offs in favourable economic context. In the case of economic downturn, 
not only voluntary quitting decrease (leading to tenure increases) and lay-offs increase (tenure 
decreases), but according to empirical evidence job destructions occurs mainly for jobs of 
shorter duration (leading as well to tenure increases). So the resulting effect will depend on 
the quit rate and the layoff rate: usually, the “shortening” effect of voluntary quits offsets the 
impact of layoffs thus generating a decline in tenure during economic upswings. The opposite 
is true in a recession period, during which average tenure increases.  
 
 
Table 3. Average tenure by age groups (1999-2006) 
15-24 25-44 45+ 
Country 
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 
Belgium 1.6 1.8  9.2 8.6  21.1 20.2 
Denmark 1.6 1.5  6.2 5.8  15.5 14.5 
Finland 1.1 1.1  7.6 6.9  17.1 17.0 
France 1.5 1.4  8.9 8.1  18.8 19.3 
Germany 2.4 2.3  8.1 8.3  17.3 17.3 
Greece 2.6 2.5  9.2 8.8  23.0 21.5 
Ireland 1.8 2.1  8.0 7.1  18.4 17.5 
Italy 2.5 2.3  9.3 8.6  20.8 20.0 
Luxembourg 2.3 2.3  8.9 8.6  19.5 18.8 
Netherlands 1.9 2.3  7.9 7.7  17.6 17.2 
Portugal 2.8 2.6  8.7 8.7  20.7 20.5 
Spain 1.5 1.6  7.5 6.6  18.3 17.7 
Sweden 1.9 1.3  8.4 7.1  18.4 17.4 
United Kingdom 1.9 2.0  7.3 7.0  13.4 13.5 
Czech Republic  2.7 2.2  7.6 7.7  14.3 14.4 
Cyprus 1.7 1.7  7.6 7.5  17.8 17.2 
Estonia 2.2 1.6  5.8 5.9  10.5 11.4 
Hungary 2.8 2.2  8.0 7.5  14.0 14.3 
Latvia 2.4  1) 1.7  7.2  1) 6.4  12.5  1) 11.3 
Lithuania 2.3 1.9  6.1 6.9  12.7 12.4 
Malta 2.8  2) 2.9  9.7  2) 10.2 18.6 18.2 
Poland 2.2 2.0  9.0 8.4  19.4 18.3 
Slovakia 2.9  1) 2.3  8.8  1) 8.0  16.3 14.7 
Slovenia 2.0 2.2  9.8 9.6  21.4 20.9 
1) 2001; 2) 2000 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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For economically advanced countries, empirical evidence finds that labour turnover typically 
accelerates in periods of economic growth and decreases in downturns: the reduction of 
voluntary quits more than counterbalances the increase in dismissals, as described before 
(Boeri, 1996; ILO, 1996; 2001). Hence, largely for supply-side reasons, labour turnover tends 
to behave pro-cyclically, while average tenure tends to decline in economic upswings. The 
combination of the different labour market institutions in these countries seems to provide 
some social security supporting workers mobility. In Central and Eastern European countries, 
this pattern appears however to be reversed, with a decrease of turnover and an increase of 
tenure in periods of economic upswings (Cazes & Nesporova, 2003); this counter-cyclical 
behaviour of labour turnover identified during the transition decade of the 1990s was 
furthermore confirmed for the first half of the 2000s (Cazes & Nesporova, 2007). It may be 
partially explained by the fact that demand for labour remained constrained for a long time in 
addition to the weak labour market institutional and policy setting of these countries: the 
resulting perception of job insecurity generated reluctance from workers to quit their jobs 
voluntary, even during economic recovery in view of the instability of newly created jobs and 
low safety nets if falling into unemployment12 (low unemployment benefits and limited active 
labour market programmes).   
 
In order to investigate whether there has been a tendency towards more instability we have 
tested the existence of a time trend by carrying out a panel regression analysis (across 
industries and over time), for each country and each age group13, taking into account the 
employment cycle effects for the whole period 1992-200614 . According to the estimates 
reported in table 4, a negative and statistically significant time trend was detected for some 
age groups in the European Union. First, job tenure of young workers (age group 15-24) 
decreased as an effect of time in all countries for which the trend variable was significant 
except for Spain, Slovenia and Malta over the 1992-2006 period. Mature workers (age group 
25-44) experienced a similar trend in a majority of countries for which the trend variable was 
significant (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Finland and the UK), while Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Slovakia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom registered also a decrease in the tenure of older workers (45+) for 
the same period. Hence in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, the decrease in tenure was generalized to the workers of all age groups. It is 
interesting to note that most of these countries are among those with very dynamic and 
flexible labour markets. A significant but positive time trend was instead found in four new 
EU members (Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta) as well as Germany for the (25- 
44). The picture for the elderly workers is more contrasted with an increase of tenure for this 
group in six of the EU-25 countries, but a decrease in seven countries.  
 
 
12 This finding was also supported by a strong correlation between economic cycle and labour market flows data, 
such as moves from employment to unemployment or inactivity for the majority of the CEE countries studied by 
Cazes and Nesporova, op. cit. 
13 The estimated equation is: ttt
j
t tBCbBCrTenure ε++++= ∑
=
17
1
jd , where d is a set of sectoral 
dummies, BCr is the growth rate of employment when negative (Recession), and BCb is the growth rate of 
employment when positive (Boom), t is a linear time trend. The dependent variable, Tenure, is expressed in 
months.   
14 Since here we want to test the existence of a time trend, we extend the time frame of the panel regression 
analysis to cover the whole period (1992-2006) to have enough observations. 
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Table 4. Trends in average tenure by age group (1992-2006) 
  Age 
Country 15-24 25-44 45+ 
Belgium -0.32 -0.62 -0.51 
Denmark -0.17 -1.23 -1.18 
Finland -0.11 -0.93 0.80 
France  -0.27 -0.64 0.81 
Germany -0.32 0.43 -0.60 
Greece -0.06 -0.07 1.09 
Ireland -0.33 -1.60 -1.43 
Italy -0.40 -0.61 -0.25 
Luxemburg -0.45 0.14 -0.40 
Netherlands 0.09 -0.22 0.03 
Portugal -0.25 -0.48 -0.07 
Spain 0.29 -0.90 -0.09 
Sweden -0.87 -1.46 -0.67 
United Kingdom -0.31 -0.28 -0.19 
Czech  Republic -0.42 0.84 1.04 
Cyprus 0.30 -0.13 -0.02 
Estonia  -0.62 0.62 0.54 
Hungary  -0.97 -0.45 1.62 
Latvia 0.27 2.80 3.16 
Lithuania -0.16 2.10 0.31 
Malta 1.03 2.00 -0.37 
Poland -0.51 0.17 -0.43 
Slovenia 0.59 0.17 0.32 
Slovakia -1.41 -1.20 -2.81 
 
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% level 
See Note 13 for details on the regression 
Number of observations varies between 77 and 252 depending on country and age 
Estimation by FGLS corrected for heteroskedasticity and AR(1) error, weighted by employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
 
To sum up, there was not a general and systematic trend towards declining job tenure over the 
period 1992-2006 in the European Union. This confirms our previous findings over the period 
1992-1999. However, extending the analysis to the most recent years, we found that young 
workers seem more likely to have shorter job tenure in more and more countries of the EU ─ 
from eleven for the 1992-1999 period to fifteen for the 1992-2006 period; secondly, this trend 
seems also to affect the mature group as well, even if the pattern is more diversified, 
increasing in some countries and decreasing in others. These findings do not however imply a 
general increase in job instability and their interpretation requires further analysis in light of 
the different theoretical tracks we briefly reviewed before.  We investigate below the role of 
EPL reforms on these patterns, since it is likely to affect the flexibility-stability nexus.  
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3.  The Role of Employment Protection 
Legislation   
3.1. Theoretical background  
 
EPL refers to regulatory provisions that relate to hiring and firing practice, particularly those 
governing termination of employment, severance payments, advance notice and other 
procedural obligations. As pointed above, EPL is an obvious candidate for explaining changes 
in job stability across countries, but also across age groups, since changes in the legislation 
may not apply to all workers. Many EPL reforms are actually quite often asymmetric in that 
they change regulations only for a subset of the eligible population. This part concentrates on 
the main theoretical results concerning the effect of EPL on labour market adjustment ─ in 
particular job stability─ and on the employment structure (shares of temporary versus 
“permanent” employment) as theory predicts that a given set of EPL provisions should affect 
the dynamic behaviour of employment and its composition rather than its average level15.    
 
The primary task of EPL is to provide more job security to workers, both in their current jobs 
and in the case of redundancy. Advance notice informs workers of layoff plans and gives 
them time to search for new jobs. EPL in some countries obliges employers to offer internal 
redeployment if possible and to cooperate with the trade unions and public labour market 
institutions on re-employment of redundant workers, while providing financial compensation 
for hardship connected with layoffs. The aim of these provisions is to strengthen longer-term 
attachment of workers to their jobs and employers or, if their internal redeployment is not 
possible, to facilitate relatively smooth external re-employment and moderate income loss. 
Stable employment prospects are there to encourage workers to undergo retraining and skills 
upgrading and to encourage enterprises to invest in workers’ training, which could lead to 
higher labour productivity and internal flexibility of the workforce, beneficial for better 
market adjustment of enterprises16– see Piore (1986).  
 
Most theoretical models indicate rather clearly that employment should be more stable and 
individual employment relationships more durable when EPL is stricter: given a constant 
cyclical wage pattern, higher firing costs stabilize employment in economic downturns but 
also deter employers from hiring in upturns: with high turnover costs, firms may become 
more cautious about adjusting their workforce with the effect of reducing labour turnover, i.e. 
movements from employment to unemployment and from unemployment back to 
employment   For partial equilibrium models see for instance Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; 
Bertola, 1992; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992, among others.  For general equilibrium 
matching models see for instance Blanchard and Portugal (1998). 
 
Another channel through which EPL reforms may affect employment patterns relate to the 
fact that quite often changes are marginal and do not concern all workers: a different degree 
of strictness of regulation governing regular versus temporary employment (fixed-term 
contracts and contracts through temporary work agencies) is likely to impact the employment 
 
15 For a more comprehensive review of the considerable research (both theoretical and empirical) produced on 
the effects of EPL on economic and aggregate labour demand, see for example OECD, 2005. 
16 Job security of workers should also moderate their resistance against the introduction of new technologies and 
working practices, Alerkof, (1984); 
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structure. Clearly, more extensive employment protection mandates for permanent jobs 
increase incentives for firms to offer temporary jobs. This has the potential effect of distorting 
the optimal composition of employment between temporary and regular contracts. Moreover, 
those who are able to maintain a regular contract (often the “insiders”, i.e. workers in regular 
jobs enjoying high employment security through EPL) will enjoy an even higher level of job 
security, bringing about an increase in wage pressure (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). In 
contrast those under temporary contracts (often the youths and other workers with little work 
experience or low skills) will bear the costs of adjustment (Saint Paul, 1996). Kahn (2007) 
found that EPL raises the relative incidence of temporary employment for workers with less 
experience and skills; these effects are often amplified in countries with higher levels of 
collective bargaining coverage. Changes in EPL regulation may thus consist in a dual-track 
reform strategy, involving reforms only at the margin, for new hires, while employment 
security entitlements of the incumbent workers remain unchanged. This would typically lead 
to increased labour market segmentation between the “insiders” and “outsiders”, and this, 
especially in countries where strict EPL for regular workers is combined with low levels of 
restrictions on fixed-term contracts. Lower firing costs for temporary jobs or higher firing 
costs for permanent jobs both reduce the likelihood that a temporary job will be converted 
into a permanent one (Cahuc and Postel–Vinay, 2002; Güell, 2003).  
 
While such strategies have been used by some countries17 as an attempt to generate jobs that 
would not have been created, such policy may encourage firms to substitute permanent for 
temporary jobs and involve high turnover in fixed-term jobs. The resulting overall effect on 
labour markets outcomes unemployment is however not clear cut as it may even lead to 
higher unemployment than before, despite the new jobs created (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002). Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) have showed that temporary jobs can explain the transitory 
“honeymoon effect” with positive employment growth in countries where workers are 
otherwise protected by strict EPL if they obtain a permanent contract; although this 
employment growth does not last forever, marginal labour marker reforms which allow for 
some flexibility due to temporary contracts are thus attractive to policy makers. Thus, while 
the effects of EPL on employment seem ambiguous, the main issue does not seem EPL per se 
but rather how it is structured. Another crucial element relates to how legislation is actually 
enforced: Bertola et al. (2000), for example, argue that given the increasing institutional 
complexity and the legislative vacuum surrounding the rights of workers under new types of 
contracts, national administrations and labour courts effectively determine the enforcement of 
employment protection legislation.  
3.2. Econometric findings 
In this section we empirically investigate the link between EPL and tenure through a cross-
country analysis. We also look at the relationship between EPL and the incidence of 
temporary employment. We find that the loosening of employment protection for regular 
contracts is associated with a decline in average tenure for young people, while there is no 
significant association between the change in the share of young people with a temporary 
contract and changes in any of the three indicators of employment protection legislation 
(regular contracts, fixed contracts, collective dismissal). The analysis is restricted to the 
period 1999-2006 due to data availability. Also, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta are 
 
17 For example Spain which in the 1980s and the 1990s use temporary contracts in order to generate jobs, 
(Dolado et al. 2002) 
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excluded from the analysis as no employment protection indicator is available for these 
countries.   
Employment protection and average tenure 
Here we look at a measure of the rate of change in average tenure in the periods 1999-2002 
and 2003-2006 for most EU member countries18 and correlate it to changes in EPL as 
measured by OECD. To take into account the impact of demographic trends and business 
cycle fluctuations19, we control in our baseline specification for changes in employment, 
expressed as the change in the number of employees belonging to each age group. A 
shrinking population implies longer average tenure, as tenure increases with age and older 
people make up a larger portion of population within each age group. Accounting for changes 
in employment controls for this. Moreover, to take into consideration changes in the age of 
entry into the labour force by young people and in job searching behaviour, we also control 
for changes in the activity rate, expressed as the change in the ratio of active people over the 
total population within each age group. A delay in labour market entry because of an increase 
in schooling implies shorter average tenure. Accounting for changes in activity rate controls 
for this. Notice that the number of employees and the activity rate are not necessarily 
collinear, as employment is measured in absolute terms, while activity is a ratio. The precise 
definition of these and other variables can be found in the data appendix. Also, notice that we 
also run regressions without any control as a robustness check.  
 
The advantage of looking at changes instead of levels is that any time-invariant difference 
across countries cancels out. Thus, differences in the economic structure, or preferences, or 
institutional setting that remained fixed in the period under analysis do not need to be taken 
into account. Comparing four-year averages smoothes short-run fluctuations, due for instance 
to the business cycle, and also address the fact that employment protection indexes are 
calculated by the OECD infrequently, namely for the period under consideration in 1998 and 
2003. The fact that we measure EPL at the beginning of the two four-year periods in which 
tenure is measured allows for some time lag in the effects of employment protection 
legislation on tenure. As a measure of the rate of change we use the difference between two 
periods divided by the average. Thus, the rate of change between 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 is 
given by: 
X
XX Δ=ˆ , where 2002199920062003 −− −=Δ XXX  and ( ) 22002199920062003 −− += XXX . 
This is somewhat different from the standard percentage change and has the advantage of 
making it possible to calculate the rate of change for a variable whose starting value is zero20. 
The analysis is conducted on three age groups: 15-24, 25-44, and 45+, that will be labelled as 
young (Y), middle (M), and old (O). Some of the covariates vary across countries and age 
groups, for instance the activity rate or employment. Others, like employment protection 
 
18 In particular, the analysis is done on EU-25 countries with the exclusion of Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and 
Malta.   
19 As we use four years averages, demographic trends should be much more prominent than business cycle 
fluctuations. 
20 Moreover, it is symmetric, in the meaning that the rate of change of a variable going from 1X to 2X is the 
same in absolute value to that of a variable going from 2X to 1X . 
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legislation indexes, vary only across countries. Thus, the equations that we estimate are in the 
following general form: 
ijjiiijiiiij ZDXDDT εγβ +∗∗′+∗∗′+= ˆˆˆ , 
where the age group is indexed by i  (with i  = Y, M, O) and the country by j . The superscript 
^ indicates the rate of change of the variable as specified above. Thus, ijTˆ  indicates the rate of 
change of average tenure for age group i  in country j . iD  is an age group dummy, ijXˆ  is a 
vector of variables varying across countries and age groups, while jZˆ  is a vector of variables 
varying across countries. ε  is a disturbance term. In the estimation we allow for correlation 
of observations within country by clustering at country level.   
 
 
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Period Average Max Min 
   Value country value country 
1999-2002 46 72 NL 36 BE 
Activity Rate - Young 
2003-2006 43 72 NL 27 LT 
1999-2002 84 89 LT 75 IT 
Activity Rate - Middle 
2003-2006 85 89 SE 77 IT 
1999-2002 41 69 SE 23 HU 
Activity Rate - Old 
2003-2006 47 73 SE 30 SI 
1998 2.485 4.333 PT 0.948 UK 
EPL RC 
2003 2.402 4.167 PT 1.115 UK 
1998 1.890 4.750 GR 0.250 IE, UK 
EPL TC 
2003 1.807 3.625 FR 0.375 SK, UK 
1998 3.389 4.875 IT, LT 0.000 LT 
EPL CD 
2003 3.425 4.875 IT   2.125 CZ, FR 
2002 39 50 IE 30 EE 
Kaitz Index 
2006 39 51 IE 29 GR 
1999-2002 8647 34868 DK 87 EE 
Expenditure on Unemployment 
2003-2006 8265 31031 DK 181 EE 
1999-2002 40 51 BE 18 IE 
Tax Wedge 
2003-2006 39 49 BE 17 IE 
1995 42 84 DK 9 FR 
Trade Union Density 
2004 31 80 DK 8 FR 
 
 
In the first specification (see Table 6) we regress tenure on employment, activity rate, and the 
three sub-indexes making up the EPL index. Summary statistics for these and others variables 
are presented in Table 5.  
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Table 6. Average Tenure and EPL - Baseline Specification 
N. of obs = 63 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.6668 
 
Young Middle Old 
Tenure Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Dummy 0.05** 2.63 0.00 -0.22 -0.01 -0.80 
Employment -0.51** -2.31 -0.19 -0.92 0.05 0.33 
Activity rate  1.16*** 4.47 -0.63 -0.75 -0.02 -0.14 
EPL RC 0.46*** 4.20 0.08 1.13 0.09 0.89 
EPL TC -0.02 -0.45 0.00 -0.15 0.01 0.36 
EPL CD 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.29 -0.02 -1.50 
 
Dependent variable: Tenure. Linear regression. Standard errors clustered by country. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%;**  idem 5% level 
 
 
As expected, for young people an increase in employment significantly decreases average 
tenure, as new entrants have by definition low tenure. For the other age categories the 
coefficient is insignificant. For these categories an increase in the number of employees is not 
only due to newly employed people, but also to the aging of the already employed, with an 
ambiguous impact on average tenure.  
 
An increase in the activity rate increases average tenure for young people, while it is 
insignificant for the other age categories. The age of entry into the labour market is probably 
the main factor determining the participation rate for the 15-24 category, with permanence in 
education the most important determinant of age of entry (Ryan, 2001). Indeed, there is a 
strong negative correlation between the change in activity rates and the change in 
participation rates in education for the countries and in the periods under consideration. 
Another factor affecting the age of entry is, for instance, the presence and length of 
compulsory military service. A deferral of entry reduces the participation rate and at the same 
time reduces the average tenure, thus inducing a positive correlation with activity rate. 
Looking at the impact of employment protection, it is the sub-index for regular contracts that 
has a significant impact on young workers tenure. The sub-indexes for temporary contracts 
and for collective dismissal are not significant, as are all sub-indexes for the other age 
categories. The sign of the coefficient implies that a change in regulation that lowers 
protection for regular contracts is associated with a decline in average tenure for young 
people. The size of the coefficient in this baseline specification implies that a decline of the 
employment protection index for regular contract by 1% is associated with a decline in 
average tenure for young people by 0.46%.  The relationship between tenure and the 
employment protection sub-index for permanent contracts is robust to different specifications. 
In Table 7 we present the regression without any other covariate, while in Table 8 we control 
for changes in several other aspects of labour market policy.  
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Table 7. Average Tenure and EPL – No Control Variables 
N. of obs = 63 Prob > F = 0.0152 R-squared = 0.1595 
Young Middle Old  
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Dummy 0.01 0.28 -0.02 -1.82 -0.01 -1.32 
EPL RC 0.55** 2.65 0.06 1.39 0.14 1.81 
 
Dependent variable: Tenure. Linear regression. Standard errors clustered by country. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%;**  idem 5% level 
 
 
 
In table 8, in particular, we control for policy indicators regarding minimum wage, 
unemployment, and taxation, plus a measure of unionisation. The limited sample size 
prevents us from adding additional covariates. Notice, however, that slow-moving 
institutional indicators, e.g. the degree of coordination in wage bargaining, should not be 
included. The selection of the additional covariates has been dictated by data availability. The 
link between some of these variables, e.g. taxation, and tenure is not straightforward; they 
have been included nonetheless as a robustness check for the relationship between tenure and 
employment protection. Changes in the Kaitz index capture the impact of minimum wage 
policy. The Kaitz index is the ratio between minimum wage and average wage and is a 
standard measure of how binding the minimum wage is. This measure is calculated only for 
countries with a statutory minimum, i.e. all but five countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, and Sweden) where sectoral minima are fixed through collective bargaining. A dummy 
variable called “No MW” controls for this. Moreover, for three countries (Belgium, France, 
and Greece) the data source is different and therefore a different variable, “Kaitz Index 2”, is 
introduced (see the data appendix for details). The change in policy for the unemployed is 
captured by changes in real per capita expenditures on both active and passive measures, 
while changes in the tax wedge (net take home pay over labour cost) capture the impact of tax 
policy. Finally, we control for trade union density. Of these additional covariates, the only one 
that is significant for young people is trade union density, with a positive coefficient implying 
that a decline in unionization is associated with a decline in average tenure for young people. 
Employment protection legislation for regular contracts remains highly significant. The 
coefficient is smaller, probably due to the fact that in the baseline regression the coefficient 
for EPL for regular contracts partly captures the impact of decreased unionization. The 
significant positive correlation between the changes in average tenure for young people and 
the changes in the EPL sub-index for regular contracts is also robust to specifications 
including only young people or expressing all variables in terms of their absolute change or 
expressing the EPL sub-indexes in terms of their absolute change and all the other variables in 
terms of percentage change (results not reported).  
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Table 8. Average Tenure and EPL – Additional Control Variables 
 N. of obs. = 63   R-squared = 0.8504 
 Young Middle Old 
 Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Dummy – Y 0.12*** 4.30 0.01 0.64 -0.03 -0.96 
Employment- Y -0.56** -2.25 -0.07 -0.37 0.07 0.34 
Activity rate – Y 0.82*** 4.29 -0.75 -1.19 0.04 0.32 
EPL RC – Y 0.37*** 4.02 0.09 0.74 0.11 0.85 
EPL TC – Y -0.04 -1.12 -0.01 -0.96 0.01 0.33 
EPL CD – Y 0.02 0.59 -0.03 -2.59 -0.03 -1.37 
Kaitz Index 1-Y 0.11 0.16 -0.59*** -4.16 -0.23 -1.30 
Kaitz Index 2-Y 0.47 1.48 0.17 1.17 0.18 0.88 
No MW – Y -0.07 -1.64 -0.01 -0.30 0.03 0.83 
Unempl.Pol.- Y -0.04 -0.71 0.06** 2.51 0.03 0.45 
Tax Wedge – Y -0.49 -1.19 0.60** 2.50 0.42 1.13 
Unionization- Y 0.26** 2.76 -0.01 -0.23 -0.03 -0.69 
Dependent variable: Tenure. Linear regression. Standard errors clustered by country. 
*** Statistically significant at 1%;**  idem 5% level; * idem 10% level 
 
We found a positive correlation between the change in average tenure for young people and 
the change in the employment protection index for regular contracts. Yet, to establish that the 
decline in average tenure for young people is actually due to the loosening of employment 
protection regulation for regular contracts is more complex. The correlation may be due to the 
common dependence of tenure and EPL on some time-varying variable that has not been 
accounted for. There may also be a reverse causality link: the decline in tenure for young 
people (due for instance to the use of fixed term contracts) may actually be the cause of the 
decline in EPL for regular contracts, through, for instance, a reduced political support for 
protection for these types of contractual arrangements. However, the fact that the relationship 
between EPL and average tenure is significant only for young people reduces the likelihood 
of an omitted variable bias, as the time-varying omitted variable should affect EPL, an 
economy wide variable, and average tenure for young people, while at the same time not 
affecting average tenure for prime-age and mature workers.  The fact that EPL is measured in 
1998 and 2003 at the beginning of the two four-year periods (1999-2002 and 2003-2006) in 
which tenure is measured reduces the likelihood that the correlation is due to reverse 
causality. 
 
How could it be the case that a reduction in employment protection for regular contracts 
affects average tenure for young people, while leaving other age categories substantially 
unaffected? One possible explanation is that because of their relative lack of experience and 
of firm-specific human capital, young people have lower “individual” bargaining power and 
therefore are more sensitive to institutional changes that increase labour market flexibility. 
The fact that young people are also the one significantly affected by the decrease in 
unionization (with lower unionization implying lower average tenure) suggests that indeed the 
“individualization” of the work relationship could affect them disproportionately.  
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Employment protection and temporary work 
 
We applied the same methodology used in the previous section to analyze the link between 
employment protection and temporary work, more specifically temporary employees as a 
percentage of the total number of employees. The same time period and the same countries 
are analyzed, with the exception of Estonia, that is excluded in this analysis due to lack of 
data on the share of temporary workers, and Austria, that is included here but was not 
included in the section on average tenure. The age categories are somehow different, with 
prime age workers defined as those between 25-49, instead of 25-44 in the previous analysis, 
and mature workers as over 50, instead of over 45.   
 
The rate of change in the share of temporary employees has been regressed on the rate of 
change of the three EPL sub-indexes for each age group, with and without additional policy 
controls, in a single regression and in separate regressions for each age group. Also, the 
absolute change instead of the rate of change has been used (results not reported). Across the 
different specifications, no EPL sub-index is ever significant for young people. Unionization 
instead has a significant impact on the share of temporary employees, with a decline in 
unionization associated with an increase in the share of young workers with a temporary 
contract. For workers over 50, there is some evidence that an increase in the protection 
indexes for regular contracts and collective dismissals is associated with a decrease in the 
share of temporary employees.   
 
4. Policy recommendations 
 
Our regression results indicate that the downward trend for average job tenure of young 
workers (15-24) in the EU-25 can be explained by the lower employment protection provided 
by law (EPL variable) and by trade unions (TU density variable). First, and in line with 
theoretical expectations, we found a direct effect of EPL for regular contract ─ which mostly 
capture dismissals costs and procedures ─ on average tenure of young workers, as indicated 
by the positive correlation between these two variables. On the other hand, we did not find 
any substitution effect due to the easing of EPL for temporary contract (which should have 
resulted in an increase of FT contracts or to deeper labour market segmentation): the EPL 
index for temporary contract is never significant in any of our specifications. Second, the 
trade unions, the other warrant for providing job security and protection against job loss, seem 
also related to job instability of young workers: more specifically, the trade union density 
variable was found statistically significant and positively correlated with average tenure for 
young workers. Hence, the general weakening of trade unions, as underlined by the dramatic 
decrease in our sample of average unionization from 42% in 1995 to 31% in 2004, seems to 
have particularly affected the most vulnerable workers group as reflected in the decline in 
average tenure of young workers. 
 
The policy implications of our findings need to be thoroughly discussed and confirmed by 
additional research in that field. They are also submitted to the usual caveats, in particular the 
complexity of measuring EPL and the lack of time series for legislation. However, our results 
suggest quite strongly that young people are particularly exposed to more unstable situation in 
the labour market, and that this trend can be explained by a direct effect of narrowing 
protection by law and by unions. One may thus consider strengthening employment 
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protection through a better protection against the risk of job loss and dismissals (here captured 
by EPL regular); on the other hand, the legislation of temporary contract (that facilitate entry 
in the labour market) does not seem to affect job tenure.  Moreover, since trade unions 
intervention matters for young people (contrary to the hypothesis that unions would care only 
about “insiders” but not about outsiders such as young people), one should “worry” about the 
impact of less powerful unions. In particular in light of the first result, one should be vigilant 
that a trend towards even more individualized employment relationship would not “over 
affect” young people. Hence, an even stronger policy intervention on the legislative side may 
be warranted. 
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Data appendix 
 
In this appendix we provide the source and a description of the data used.  
 
Tenure and employment: Eurostat LFS.  
The tenure variable is derived from questions asking the Year/Month in which the person 
started working for the current employer or as self-employed. Average tenure for the periods 
1999-2002 and 2003-2006 is considered, with the exception of Latvia and Slovakia for which 
the first period is limited to 2001-2002 due to data availability.  
 
Activity rate: Eurostat.  
It is defined as active persons as % of same age total population for the following age 
categories: 15-24, 25-54, 55-64. In the analysis, the age category 25-54 has been associated 
with the middle (M) age group, and the category 55-64 to the old (O) one. Averages for the 
periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 are considered.  
 
EPL: OECD and own calculations. 
The EPL index for 1998 and 2003 is considered. The EPL index is provided by OECD for 
member states. For Estonia 1998, Lithuania 1998 and Latvia 1998 and 2003 the index has 
been calculated by the authors according to OECD methodology based on information in 
Eamets and Masso (2004) and for Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2003 and Slovenia 1998 and 2003 
the index has been calculated by the authors according to OECD methodology based on 
information derived from national legislation (see Tonin, 2005). For details about OECD 
methodology see OECD (2004).  
 
Kaitz Index: Eurostat and own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat data. 
Eurostat provides the minimum monthly wage as a percentage of average gross monthly 
earnings in industry and services for all countries with the exception of Denmark, Sweden, 
Italy, Germany, Austria, and Finland, where there is no statutory minimum wage, and 
Belgium, France, and Greece. For the last three countries Eurostat provides the monthly 
minimum wage, while the OECD Taxing Wages database provides the average gross wage 
earnings of adult, full-time workers in industry sectors C-K. The Kaitz index for these three 
countries is calculated by the authors by dividing these two quantities. The Kaitz index for 
2002 and 2006 is considered, with the exception of Estonia, Latvia, and the Netherlands for 
which the index for 2002 and 2005 is considered due to data availability.   
 
Expenditure on Unemployment: Eurostat and own calculations.  
Eurostat provides expenditures on unemployment at constant prices (EUR 1995) per 
inhabitant, including both active (e.g. vocational training, placement services and job search 
assistance) and passive (e.g. unemployment benefits, redundancy compensation) measures. 
Eurostat also provides the unemployment rate over total working age population and the total 
working age population (15-64) over total population. The expenditure on unemployment per 
unemployed has then been calculated by the authors. Average expenditures in the period 
1999-2002 and 2003-2005 have been considered, except for Estonia and Poland where the 
first period is limited to 2000-2002 due to data availability and for Portugal where the second 
period is 2003-2004.  
 
Tax wedge: Eurostat.  
This indicator is calculated by Eurostat as income tax on gross wage earnings plus the 
employee’s and the employer’s social security contributions, expressed as a percentage of the 
total labour costs of the earner, defined as gross earnings plus the employer’s social security 
contributions plus payroll taxes (where applicable). It is calculated for single persons without 
 22
children earning 67% of the average wage. Before 2000 (for Ireland for the whole period) the 
average wage was that of an average production worker working full time in manufacturing. 
Since 2000 (for Slovenia and Estonia since 2005) it is the average wage in Industry and 
Services (NACE C-K). Averages for the periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 are considered.   
 
Trade Union Density: European Commission.  
Trade union density is calculated as number of gainfully employed trade unions members 
(thus excluding unemployed, students or retired) divided by the total wage earners population 
of the country. Data are from 1995 (1996 for France, 1998 for Latvia and Lithuania) and for 
2004 (2003 for Czech Republic). See European Commission, Industrial relations report 2006, 
2006, p.25 for further details.  
 
 
 
